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COMPARING "APPELS" AND ORANGES:
EVALUATING THE LINK BETWEEN APPEAL




In this essay, I will attempt to explain why criminal appeal
processes in France and Canada are so fundamentally different.
At first glance, this is a simple question, with an obvious
answer. Sometimes, however, obvious answers to simple
questions can lead the academically minded among us onto long
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journeys of inquiry, in our efforts to uncover, beyond the
obvious, why things exist or are done in a certain way.
By way of example, consider that "[a]ppeals . . . are not a
logical corollary of the exercise of judgment."' Indeed, as Dean
Jurtas has pointed out,
there is nothing inherent in the notion of decision-making
which requires that every decision be reviewable by a
second decision-maker. From the perspective of
institutional design, the possibility of appeals-that is, the
possibility of having a second person decide on the same
issue after an original decision has been made-and the
scope of appeals are matters of choice.2
In other words, the simple question "Why do appeals exist
at all, or in given form?" can be answered with the obvious
statement "For different reasons that we have, institutionally,
settled upon." One cannot argue with this conclusion; it is
undoubtedly true. But from a scholarly perspective, it is also
somewhat unsatisfying: It leaves us wondering, again and again,
why? Why has a particular form of appellate law developed in a
given jurisdiction? What logic underlies the choices that have
been made in adopting a certain mechanism for appeals?
This type of probing intellectual inquiry is perhaps most
common among comparative law scholars, who, by the nature of
their work, must often confront and account for differences in
laws across jurisdictions. Thus, when a comparative law scholar
asks why Canada and France have such markedly different
criminal appeal processes, that scholar will not likely accept the
obvious response that the laws enabling appeals in each
jurisdiction provide for different forms of appeal. The truth of
that obvious assertion does not ensure its sufficiency as a
response to the question that was originally asked.
My goal in this essay, therefore, is to probe beyond the
superficial in order to ascertain why criminal appeals in Canada
and France exist in such distinctly different forms. The first part
of the ensuing discussion will briefly review some of the theory
explaining, generally, why appeals exist within legal systems. In
Part III, the law dealing with criminal appeals in Canada and
1. Daniel Jurtas, The Narrowing Scope of Appellate Review: Has the Pendulum
Swung Too Far? 32 Man. L. J. 61, 62 (2008).
2. Id.
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France will be summarized. Next, in Part IV, the Canadian and
French criminal judiciaries will be described. Finally, in Part V,
I will attempt to demonstrate that a link exists between the
design of the appellate processes and the design of the
institutions of the judiciary in both Canada and France.
Ultimately, I will argue that criminal appeals in Canada and
France are different because the two jurisdictions train, educate,
and view the abilities of judges in very different ways, and
because each appeal system is therefore built around distinct
assumptions about the capacities of judges to perform their
functions at trial and on appeal.
II. THE THEORETICAL BASIS FOR APPEALS
As I have already suggested, the decision to permit criminal
appeals in one form or another is, at least in Canada and France,
a matter of legislative choice. It is important to understand,
however, that there may be valid reasons to restrict or withhold a
right to appeal, as much as there may be reasons to grant such a
right. For instance, one could argue that, in order to "promote
the autonomy and integrity of proceedings" 3 at the trial level,
there should not be recourse to an appellate court for a decision
on the same matter. After all, if parties to a proceeding know
that any trial decision is subject to appeal, then there is a danger
that they will treat the trial as a sort of dress rehearsal for the
appeal that may inevitably follow, which would tend to
undermine the authority of the trial court.4
Alternately, one could argue that, in a society with limited
resources devoted to justice functions by government, it would
be irresponsible or inefficient to commit a portion of those
3. Housen v Nikolaisen, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235, 2002 SCC 33, at } 17 (discussing how
this concept of maintaining the autonomy and integrity of trial proceedings militates in
favour of a deferential standard of appellate review).
4. See e.g. id. ("The presumption underlying the structure of our court system is that a
trial judge is competent to decide the case before him or her, and that a just and fair
outcome will result from the trial process. Frequent and unlimited appeals would
undermine and weaken public confidence in the trial process."). This discussion in Housen
suggests that the concept of maintaining the autonomy and integrity of trial proceedings
militates in favour of a more deferential standard of appellate review, but I think that this
concept could equally be cited as a reason for denying or restricting a right to appeal in the
first place.
169
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
resources toward appeals of matters that have already been
adjudicated before a competent trial authority. Rather than
constituting appeal courts to re-evaluate trial decisions, perhaps
society would be better served by constituting more trial courts,
so that participants in criminal justice systems could be dealt
with more expeditiously.
Notwithstanding the persuasiveness of the above
arguments, there are probably more compelling reasons why
appeals, at least in criminal matters, should be permitted. To
begin with, human beings, including trial judges, are fallible:
"[H]umans do not always work to capacity. Being human, they
err."6 One of the purposes of appeals and reviews, therefore, is
to detect and correct errors that might have been made by the
court of first instance. As Justice Arbour of the Supreme Court
of Canada pointed out in Moreau-Birub v. New Brunswick
(Judicial Council),7 the appeal process "is designed to correct
errors in the original decision and set the course for the proper
development of legal principles."8 This obvious error-correction
role of appellate courts is a necessary one if the integrity of our
justice system is to be maintained, as it would be difficult to
defend a system that permits legal errors to be upheld. In any
event, if we accept that trial judges can make mistakes, then it is
easy for us also to accept that appellate authorities must, from
time to time, be permitted to intervene to correct these mistakes.
Appellate courts arguably also have a duty to standardize
the application of laws within their jurisdictions, so that like
cases can generally be decided alike. As the SCC explained in
Housen, "the primary role of appellate courts is to delineate and
refine legal rules and ensure their universal application." 9 This
5. The suggestion that a "scarcity of resources" should militate in favour of a
deferential standard of appellate review has been raised in the scholarly literature, see e.g.
Roger Kerans & Kim Willey, Standards of Review Employed by Appellate Courts 18 (2d
ed., Juriliber 2006), just as the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) has suggested that a
deferential standard of appellate review should assist in "limiting the number, length, and
cost of appeals," Housen, 2 S.C.R. 235 at 16 (focusing on deference to fact finding by the
trial court). Again, however, the same arguments could just as easily be marshalled in order
to restrict or (in extreme cases) deny a right of appeal.
6. Kerans & Willey, supra n. 5, at 5.
7. [2002] 1 S.C.R. 249, 2002 SCC 11, 58.
8. Id. at 158.
9. Housen, 2002 SCC 33, 1 9.
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standardizing role, or "call for universality" that extends to
appellate authorities, "has both a time and a place component."' 0
That is to say, the law should be standardized such that the same
result obtains both today and in the future (the temporal
component), just as it obtains equally in a major metropolitan
centre as much as in a small countryside community (the spatial
component). In this respect, appellate courts serve as centralized
coordinating authorities that prescribe overarching rules of law
for application by each court within their respective
jurisdictions. Thus, appeals are necessary in order for higher
courts to give guidance, and to ensure that their guidance is
being properly incorporated into the decisions of trial courts.
Finally, a theoretical basis for appeals exists once it is
recognized that higher courts can have a law-making, or
developmental role to fulfill. The developmental role of
appellate courts is conceptually difficult to understand, because,
at first glance, this role appears to operate at cross-purposes with
the courts' standardizing role: How can the law be applied
consistently by an appellate court if that body is also responsible
for leading the law through periodic phases of evolution?
Nonetheless, this law-making role has been acknowledged by
the SCC in numerous decisions, throuh references to a duty of
appellate courts to "refine legal rules," or to "set the course for
the proper development of legal principles." 12 It is perhaps
easiest to reconcile the competing roles of appellate courts by
viewing law not as a static body of rules, but as a process subject
to continuous modification. This process, as Kerans and Willey
have explained, requires appellate judges to engage in creative
interpretations of past statements of the law, so that these
statements can take on meanings that are consistent with a
society's changing expectations of the law.13 Again, as appellate
courts have a duty to standardize laws, then the higher courts
should also be vested with the duty (if such a duty is to exist) of
leading changes in the law when it becomes apparent, through
review of a trial decision, that such changes are necessary.
10. Kerans & Willey, supra n. 5, at 7.
11. Housen, 2002 SCC 33, 9.
12. Bgrubd, 2002 SCC 11, 58.
13. Kerans & Willey, supra n. 5, at 8-12.
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Not all of the above justifications for permitting appeals
will be relevant to the same degree in every jurisdiction and
every legal tradition.14 For instance, the developmental role of
appellate courts would likely not be recognized within civilian
legal systems (such as the French system), where the law is said
to be comprehensively codified in statutes, as much as within
common law systems (such as the Canadian system), where the
law may exist as much in precedent and tradition as in
legislation. However, at least one of the above justifications
could be relied upon in almost any jurisdiction as providing a
theoretical basis for appeals.
In reality, a right of appeal by an individual who has been
convicted of a criminal offence exists in most democratic legal
traditions, and elsewhere throughout the world. The universality
of this right of appeal is both reflected in, and reinforced by,
Article 14(5) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights: "[E]veryone convicted of a crime shall have the right to
his conviction and sentence being reviewed by a higher tribunal
according to law."' 5 In recognition of the fact that appeals are
widely permitted within criminal justice systems, then, it is
perhaps more productive to assess whether appeals are permitted
according to different conditions in various jurisdictions, and, if
so, why?
III. THE LAW OF CRIMINAL APPEALS IN CANADA AND FRANCE
In the sub-sections of this paper that follow, I will describe
the essential characteristics of Canadian and French criminal
appeal systems, including who can appeal, on what grounds, to
what court, composed of what judges, on what type of evidence,
and in accordance with what standard of review. An
14. I note, at this point, that much of the above discussion regarding the justifications in
favour of and against having appeals within a legal system has been informed by my earlier
work on standards of appellate and judicial review in Canada. See Mike Madden,
Conquering the Common Law Hydra: A Probably Correct and Reasonable Overview of
Current Standards ofAppellate and Judicial Review, 36 Advoc. Q. 269 (2010) [hereinafter
"Hydra: Probably Correct"]; Mike Madden, Conquering the Common Law Hydra: A
Consolidated Guide to Standards of Appellate and Judicial Review (August 2009)
(unpublished ms. commissioned by and produced for N.S. Ct. of App.).
15. Intl. Covenant on Civ. & Political Rights [ICCPR], 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368
(19 Dec.1966) (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
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understanding of this information is important not only so that
the two systems can be juxtaposed for analysis, but also because
it will provide the basis for my ultimate argument that the
Canadian and French appeal systems are designed around
different assumptions about the judiciaries in each jurisdiction.
A. Criminal Appeals in Canada
In order to understand the criminal appeal process in
Canada, one must first learn something of the country's court
structure. The names of different levels of criminal courts in
Canada vary from province to province, but each province has a
Court of Appeal that serves as its highest court. Additionally,
each has a superior court of criminal jurisdiction, which could
be called, for instance, the Supreme Court of the province, the
Court of Queen's Bench, or the Superior Court of Justice,
depending on its location. Finally, each province has a
provincial court for criminal matters, which could be called
simply Provincial Court or Court of Justice; these provincial
courts also typically serve as summary conviction courts.
In Canada, criminal offences can be tried either as
summary conviction offences, or indictable offences, and this
classification largely determines the court before which an
accused will appear for trial. 16 Summary conviction offences are
tried by "summary conviction courts," as defined at section 785
of the Code,17 in accordance with section 798 of the Code.
Indictable offences can typically be tried by either a superior
court of criminal jurisdiction 8 (with or without a jury)19 or by a
provincial court judge sitting alone, at the election of the
accused.2o Some of the most serious indictable offences can only
16. The system of classifying offences, and of determining the mode of a trial and the
court before which a trial in the first instance will take place, is not simple or intuitive
under the Canadian law. To understand the discussion of appeals in this essay, however,
one needs only the sort of basic familiarity with criminal procedure relating to trials in the
first instance that is provided in this paragraph.
17. Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46 [hereinafter "Code"]. It should be noted that
the Code encapsulates elements of both substantive criminal law and criminal procedure.
18. Id. at § 468.
19. Id. at § 536(2).
20. Id.
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be tried by a superior court of criminal jurisdiction.21 However,
other less serious indictable offences fall within the absolute
jurisdiction of provincial courts, and do not give rise to an
election as to mode of trial for the accused.22
1. Appeals from Summary Conviction Decisions
A defendant has a right, under s. 813(a) of the Code, to
appeal a summary conviction, an associated sentence, or certain
decisions relating to mental fitness, while the Crown has a more
limited right, under section 813(b), to appeal a sentence, a stay
of proceedings, or certain decisions relating to mental fitness of
the defendant. Although it is not expressly written in the Code, a
defendant's right of appeal on a conviction entails (as the
permissible "grounds" of appeal) a right to seek review of
findings of fact (including inferences of fact) 23 and/or law made
by the trial court.24
Both the Crown and the Defendant can appeal to an "appeal
court," 25 which is in each province the superior court of criminal
jurisdiction for that province. In other words, a single justice of
the Supreme Court of a province, sitting as a Summary
Conviction Appeal Court (SCAC), will hear an appeal from a
summary conviction offence.
The powers of a SCAC are set forth at section 822(1) of the
Code, which provides that a SCAC has essentially the same
powers as a Court of Appeal for a province hearing an appeal
from an indictable offence decision.26 It is interesting to note
21. Id. at § 469.
22. Id. at § 553.
23. In Housen, 2002 SCC 33 at 25, the SCC noted that, for appellate review purposes,
there is no longer any meaningful distinction between findings of fact and inferences of
fact.
24. As I have argued elsewhere, it is no longer helpful to consider an additional ground
of appeal on questions of mixed fact and law:
If, on the one hand, a supposed question of mixed fact and law contains an
"extricable" error in principle, then the question is actually two separate
questions: one of law (the extricable issue), and one of fact (the underlying facts
that surround the legal issue). If, on the other hand, a supposed question of
mixed fact and law does not contain any extricable errors in principle, then it is
really just a complex question of fact.
Madden, Hydra: Probably Correct, supra n. 14, at 284.
25. Code §§ 812, 813.
26. I will discuss these powers in more detail below. See pp. 177-79, infra.
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that section 822 also permits a SCAC to determine an appeal by
holding a trial de novo, when, "because of the condition of the
record of the trial in the summary conviction court or for any
other reason," the SCAC determines that "the interests of justice
would be better served by hearing and determining the appeal by
holding a trial de novo."27 Thus, rather than determining an
appeal on the basis of the record of a trial, a SCAC could begin
"a new trial on the entire case-that is, on both questions of fact
and issues of law-conducted as if there had been no trial in the
first instance."28 In spite of the Code's broad provision enabling
trials de novo, however, Canadian courts have clearly
established that trials de novo should be the exception, rather
than the rule, for disposing of summary conviction appeals:
A brief history of s. 822(4) is in order. Before 1976, the
year in which the subsection was passed, appeals in
summary conviction matters went automatically by way of
trial de novo unless the court ordered another mode of
appeal. This change in legislation was obviously the result
of a change in policy, namely to make appeals by trial de
novo the exception rather than the rule. [ ... ] I agree with
this inference and therefore read the subsection, particularly
the words which grant a trial de novo "for any other
reason", restrictively. The case law interpreting s. 822(4)
says that the appellant must establish either that there is
something about the condition of the record which prevents
an appeal based on that record, or that there was a denial of
natural justice in the summary conviction court.29
Thus, instead of conducting an appeal de novo, a SCAC
will typically determine an appeal on the record, which shall
consist of "the conviction, order or order of dismissal and all
other material in [the summary conviction court's] possession in
connection with the proceedings," 30 and which may also include
a transcript of any evidence given at the trial, furnished to the
SCAC by the appellant.3'
27. Code § 822(4).
28. Black's Law Dictionary 1645 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 9th ed., West 2009) (defining
trial de novo).
29. R. v. Leung, 54 Alta. L.R. (3d) 1, [1998] 2 W.W.R. 178, 33-34.
30. Code §821(1).
31. Id. at §821(3).
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The standard of review to be applied by a SCAC has been
established at common law, and it is generally said that
"[a]bsent an error of law or a miscarriage of justice, the test to
be applied by the Summary Conviction Appeal Court is whether
the findings of the trial judge are unreasonable or cannot be
supported by the evidence."32 Similarly, the SCC has stated that,
on sentence appeals, "absent an error in principle, failure to
consider a relevant factor, or an overemphasis of the appropriate
factors, a court of appeal should only intervene to vary a
sentence imposed at trial if the sentence is demonstrably
unfit."33 In other words, as I have argued elsewhere,34 the
standard of review on questions of law is correctness (or a lack
35
of errors), and on questions of fact is reasonableness (or an
assessment that the findings of fact cannot be unreasonable).36
Beyond a SCAC, a defendant or the Crown can appeal to
the Court of Appeal of the province on a question of law alone,
with leave of the Court of Appeal.37 Such an appeal would
typically be heard by a panel of three justices of the Court of
Appeal, but nothing would preclude a Chief Justice from
assigning five judges to a given appeal. The powers of a
provincial Court of Appeal when hearing an appeal from a
decision of a SCAC are the same as a Court of Appeal's powers
when hearing an appeal from a trial court decision relating to an
indictable offence. Similarly, the appeal from a decision of a
SCAC would be determined on the basis of the record, just as an
appeal from a trial court's decision relating to an indictable
offence would be determined. 39 The standards of review
32. R. v. Nickerson, 178 N.S.R. 2d 189 (C.A.), [1999] N.S.J. No. 210, at 18.
33. R. v. M (CA.), 46 C.R. (4th) 269, [1996] 1 SCR 500, 90. This proposition was
recently affirmed in R. v. M (L.), 293 D.L.R. (4th) 1, [2008] 2 SCR 163, 14.
34. See Madden, Hydra: Probably Correct, supra n. 14, at 282-86, 288.
35. A standard of correctness implies that no deference will be shown to a lower court;
if the lower court decision is not correct in the eyes of an appellate court, then the appellate
court will simply replace the original incorrect decision with its own view of what the
original decision should have been.
36. A standard of reasonableness implies that deference will be shown to a lower court.
The lower court need not have reached exactly the same conclusion as the appellate court
in order for the former's decision to be upheld, so long as the trial decision falls within the
possible range of reasonable outcomes.
37. Code § 839(1).
38. Id. at § 839(2). I discuss these powers below. See pp. 177-79, infra.
39. Id.
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applicable at the provincial Court of Appeal would remain
correctness on questions of law, and reasonableness on
questions of fact 40 (although other equivalent phrasings, such as
"palpable and overriding error" are often used to describe the
standard of review on questions of fact).
Finally, in certain circumstances, a party can appeal a
decision of a provincial Court of Appeal relating to a summary
conviction offence to the SCC, but only with leave of the
provincial Court of Appeal,4 1 or of the SCC itself.42 Leave to
appeal could be granted by a provincial Court of Appeal on any
question "that ought to be submitted to the Supreme Court for
decision," 43 which could (theoretically) include both questions
of law and questions of fact, although the latter is unlikely to be
deemed worthy of submission to the SCC. Leave to appeal could
be granted by the SCC itself, even if leave has been denied by a
provincial Court of Appeal, on any question that is
by reason of its public importance or the importance of any
issue of law or any issue of mixed law and fact involved in
that question, one that ought to be decided by the Supreme
Court or is, for any other reason, of such a nature or
significance as to warrant decision by it.4
An appeal to the SCC would typically be heard by a panel of
seven judges, although it is not uncommon for the Court to sit
with nine judges for the hearing of a particularly significant
appeal. The standards of review applicable at the SCC would be
identical to those applicable at the provincial Court of Appeal.45
No judicial appeal exists beyond an appeal to the SCC in
Canada.
2. Appeals Relating to Indictable Offences
Both an accused and the Crown have a right to appeal from
trial decisions relating to indictable offences, but leave to appeal
40. See generally Madden, Hydra: Probably Correct, supra n. 14.
41. Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, § 37 [hereinafter "Supreme Court Act"].
42. Id. at § 40(1).
43. Id. at § 37.
44. Id. at § 40(1).
45. See generally Madden, Hydra: Probably Correct, supra n. 14.
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46
may be required, depending on the ground of appeal. Appeals
are directed to the "court of appeal,"4 7 which is defined to mean
the relevant provincial Court of Appeal.4 8 A panel of three
judges would typically hear an appeal, but nothing precludes a
Chief Justice from assigning five judges to a panel for a given
appeal.
An initial appeal to a provincial Court of Appeal is
determined on the basis of the record from trial of the indictable
offence. Specifically, the trial court (or, in practice, the
appellant) will furnish to the Court of Appeal a copy of the
evidence taken at the trial, any charge to the jury and any
objections that were made to a charge to the jury, the reasons for
judgment, if any, and the addresses of the prosecutor and the
counsel for the accused if a ground for the appeal is based on
either of the addresses. 4 Although a provincial Court of Appeal
has the power to consider evidence other than that which is
found within the trial record, such as by ordering a witness to be
examined on appeal,o or by receiving the evidence of an
appellant during an appeal,s' it should be noted that these are
extraordinary measures that are only invoked when a Court of
Appeal "considers it in the interests of justice" to receive such
evidence, 52 whereas the trial record is furnished to the Court of
Appeal in every appeal.
The powers of a Court of Appeal, as set forth in section 686
of the Code, are broad and perhaps surprising to some: The
Court can affirm the original decision, order a new trial, vary a
sentence, substitute an acquittal for a verdict of guilty, or (under
limited circumstances) substitute a verdict of guilty for an
acquittal-a power that would likely not be thought of as
legitimate in the United States. The standard of review that a
provincial Court of Appeal would apply in relation to indictable
offence appeals, as for appeals against SCAC decisions, would
46. Code §§ 675, 676.
47. Id.
48. Id. at § 2. In Prince Edward Island, however, the provincial Court of Appeal is
actually called the Appeal Division of the Supreme Court. Id.
49. Code § 682(2).
50. Id. at § 683(l)(b).
51. Id. at § 683(l)(d).
52. Id. at § 683(1).
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be correctness on questions of law, and reasonableness (or some
equivalent expression) on questions of fact.
A further appeal to the SCC by either a defendant or the
Crown on a question of law alone exists as a matter of right,
under the Code, where a judge of the provincial Court of Appeal
dissents on a question of law.5 3 Each party may also appeal to
the SCC on a question of law, even in the absence of a
dissenting judgment in the provincial Court of Appeal, if leave
to appeal is granted by the SCC.54 Outside of the context of the
Code, it is also possible that either the Crown or an accused may
be granted leave to appeal to the SCC (perhaps even on a
question of fact) under the authority of the Supreme Court Act. 5
The law in this respect is identical to that addressing appeals to
the SCC on summary conviction offence decisions.56 The
standard of review applied by the SCC would also be
correctness on questions of law, and reasonableness on
questions of fact.
3. Summarizing the Criminal Appeal Process in Canada
As the above discussion has demonstrated, the law relating
to criminal appeals in Canada is complex, in that its content is
scattered throughout the Code, the Supreme Court Act, and the
common law. However, certain elements of appellate procedure
are consistent throughout the various steps within Canada's
criminal appeal structure. For instance, regardless of the nature
of the initial offence, successive appeals will be heard by
increasingly larger appellate panels, and in all appeals other than
an appeal to a SCAC, the appellate court will consist of more
judges than the trial court. Additionally, in any appeal, the
standard of review on questions of law is correctness, and the
standard of review on questions of fact is reasonableness; in
other words, a trial judge is always entitled to deference on
questions of fact, and in criminal matters, a trial judge is never
entitled to deference on questions of law. Finally, in all criminal
appeals, the determination of a given appeal will normally (and
53. Id. at §§ 691(1)(a), 693(1)(a).
54. Id. at §§ 691(1)(b), 693(1)(b), respectively.
55. Supreme Court Act § 40(1).
56. See rn. 41-44, supra, and associated text.
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almost always) be made on the basis of the record at trial and in
any lower courts. These features of the Canadian criminal appeal
process are all noteworthy, because they differ in significant
respects from appellate procedure in French law, to which I will
now turn.
B. Criminal Appeals in France
Before my discussion of criminal appeals in France, some
background on the different types of crimes tried with the
involvement of professional judges, and the courts in which they
are tried: The "tribunal de qolice" (police court) tries "les
contraventions" (petty crimes), 7 and is presided over by a single
judge.58 The "tribunal correctionel" (correctional court) tries "les
d6lits" (misdemeanours),5 9 and is Xresided over by three judges:
a president and two other judges. Finally the "cour d'assises"
(assize court) tries "les crimes" (felonies), and is presided over
by three professional judges (one president 2 and two
63assessors) , in addition to a jury made up of nine lay
members. The assize court reaches decisions on the basis of
votes cast by each judicial and lay member, and no s ecial
weight is assigned to the votes of the professional judges. The
assize court renders decisions on both findings (guilt or
acquittal) and sentences.66
57. Code de procedure p6nal, art. 521 [hereinafter "CPP"].
58. CPP, art. 523; see also John Bell, Judiciaries within Europe: A Comparative
Review 46 (Cambridge U. Press 2006). Interestingly, Bell also notes that ninety-eight
percent of cases in police court lead to convictions. Id.
59. CPP, art. 381.
60. CPP, art. 398; Bell, supra n. 58, at 46 (observing that the conviction rate in
correctional court is approximately ninety-five percent).
61. CPP, art. 181, 231.
62. CPP, art. 244.
63. CPP, art. 248.
64. CPP, art. 296.; Bell, supra n. 58, at 46 (observing that, in 2001, the conviction rate
at the assize court was 95.7 percent).
65. CPP, art. 356-58. Any decision that is unfavourable to the accused must be reached
by a majority of eight (out of twelve) votes. CCP, art. 359.
66. CCP, art. 362; see also Bron McKillop, Review of Convictions after Jury Trials:
The New French Jury Court ofAppeal, 28 Sydney L. Rev. 343, 344 (2006) ("In its present
form [the assize court] is comprised of three judges (a President and two assessors) and
nine jurors who, since 1941, sit and deliberate together both on culpability and
punishment.").
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1. Appeals from Decisions of the Police Court
Appeals against decisions of the police court are made to
the "cour d'appel" (appeal court). These appeals are
investigated and tried in the same manner as appeals from
judgments made in misdemeanour matters (which I will discuss
in more detail, below). In the case of appeals from decisions of
the police court, however, the appeal court is presided over by
only the president of the correctional appeal court, sitting as a
single judge.68 A right of appeal exists for the state, the
defendant, and the person liable under the civil law.69 The
standard of review and broad grounds of review are identical to
those applicable to appeals from decisions made in
misdemeanour matters.o
2. Appeals from Decisions of the Correctional Court
Appeals against misdemeanour decisions of the
correctional court are also made to the appeal court;7 1 however,
on such appeals, the court is presided over by three professional
judges: one president, and two other judges.72 The appeal
proceeds as a trial de novo:73 The rules applicable at the trial
(correctional) court are largely applicable again at the apeal
court;74 the defendant is examined by the appeal court;7 and,
any witnesses summoned by the defendant are heard by the
appeal court,76 although "witnesses are not normally called,
either at the first instance hearing or on the appeal,"7 7 since the
67. CPP, art. 547.
68. Id.
69. CPP, art. 546. It should be noted that French criminal trials allow for the concurrent
hearing of civil claims that arise out of a criminal act, such that there might be a civil
claimant ("the civil party") who is a party to the criminal trial, just as there might be a
person who is liable under the civil law at the trial.
70. See § III(B)(2), infra.
71. CPP, art. 496.
72. CPP, art. 510.
73. See McKillop, supra n. 66, at 346 ("The appeal is by way of a rehearing, the facts
particularly being re-examined.").
74. CPP, art. 512.
75. CPP, art. 513.
76. Id.
77. McKillop, supra n. 66, at 346.
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"dossier" or case file is the critical source of evidence both at
trial and on appeal. Some of the rules of evidence that are
applicable at the correctional court (and that are therefore also
applicable at the appeal court) include the right of a judge to
receive any mode of evidence according to his innermost
conviction, and a right of a judge to inspect any premises (or
"perform a viewing" as one might say in Canadian legal
parlance) in order to discover the truth of a matter.7 9 In other
words, the appeal is determined on any evidence, whether taken
at trial or not, that the appeal court deems relevant. The appeal
court is vested with powers to uphold or reverse a trial
judgment, either in whole or in part.8 Thus, the appeal court, in
appeals relating to both petty crime and misdemeanour matters,
can confirm, quash, or vary a lower court's decision.
It becomes apparent that the appeal court is a "juge en fait
et en droit" (competent to rule on both the facts and the merits)
that has as its mission the "examen des faits" (finding of facts)
and "application de la loi" (application of the law),81 and that the
standard of review at the appeal court, whether on an appeal
from a decision of the police court or of the correctional court, is
correctness on both questions of law and fact. 82 Like appeal
courts in Canada, the French appeal court can substitute its own
view for that of the trial court regarding the correct
interpretation of any point of law. However, the appeal court is
also free to hear new evidence or re-hear evidence that was
received at trial, just as it is free to weigh all of the evidence in
whatever manner it pleases, regardless of how a trial court
characterized and weighed the evidence. There is thus no
78. CPP, art. 427.
79. CPP, art. 456.
80. CPP, art. 515.
81. Republique Frangaise, Ministbre de la Justice et des libdrtes, Publications,
L'organisation de la Justice, http://www.justice.gouv.fr/publications-10047/outils-
pedagogiques-12161/presentation-de-lorganisation-de-la-justice-21695.html, at slides 30-
32 (Feb. 1, 2012) [hereinafter "Ministry of Justice Video"]. To reach a version of this video
with narration in English, click the Union Jack next to the globe in the top right corner of
the main page, then click the photo icon next to "The Justice system in France" in the menu
at the right margin of the "Multilinguisme" page.
82. Bell, supra n. 58, at 46 (noting that "appeal lies on law and fact," but that,
"[blecause there is a file on the case containing all the elements of the evidence produced
by the lower civil and criminal courts, it is easy to conduct such an appeal on fact as well
as law").
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deference to a trial court, even on questions of fact, at the French
criminal appeal court.
3. Appeals from Decisions of the Assize Court
Appeals from decisions of the assize court are brought
before another assize court.83 The new assize court, when
hearing a matter on appeal, is again composed of three
professional judges (one president84 and two assessors"), but it
is augmented by an additional twelve jurors,86 as opposed to the
nine jurors who normally augment the court during a trial at first
instance,8 7 in all but two very limited circumstances.88 Thus, an
appeal of a decision by the assize court will usually result in
simply another jury trial of the same matter, by a differently
constituted assize court.
A right of appeal is afforded to the state, the defendant, the
person who is liable under the civil law, or the civil party." The
assize court, on appeal, will re-examine a case in accordance
with the rules applicable to trials in the first instance before the
assize court, 90 which means that the appellate assize court can
hear witness testimony and fresh evidence as a matter of routine
just as the court of first instance could hear such evidence.91
Indeed, to clarify the role of the relatively new assize court
hearing appeals, the French Ministry of Justice initially
published an information circular that
made clear that the cour d'assises d'appel, a "juridicial
innovation", is not a traditional French appeal court
concerned to "confirm, amend or overturn" a first instance
decision but a court which must "entirely re-examine" a
83. CPP, art 380-1.
84. CPP, art. 244.
85. CPP, art. 248.
86. CPP, art. 296.
87. Id.
88. CPP, art. 380-1. In certain cases in which an appeal is brought solely in respect of a
misdemeanour that was related to a felony, the appeal is heard at the assize court by only
the three professional judges. Id.
89. CPP, art. 380-2.
90. Id.
91. See e.g. CPP, art. 329.
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case as far as practicable without reference to an earlier first
instance hearing.92
The above rules for the hearing of appeals by a second
assize court again indicate that the standard of review applicable
on appeals of felony matters is correctness for questions of both
law and fact: The original assize court is shown no deference in
its findings, and the second assize court is free to substitute its
own view of the case for that of the assize trial court.
4. Appeals to the Court of Cassation
Judgments made by courts of final instance in felony,
misdemeanour, or petty crime matters can be appealed, by way
of application, to the criminal chamber of the French Court of
Cassation.93 The composition of a panel that hears an application
to the criminal chamber of the Court of Cassation varies
according to the circumstances:
A case is heard by three judges when an appeal is
inadmissible or not based on arguable grounds, which
results in its being declared "not admitted" (non admis), or
also when it seems necessary to settle the case. Otherwise,
the case must be heard by a bench consisting of at least five
voting members. When so decided by its president, the
chamber may also sit as a full bench, for instance because
the decision required in a case could result in a reversal of
case law or because it has to rule on a sensitive issue.94
The grounds for cassation, or quashing of a lower court's
decision, are outlined at Articles 591-99 of the CPP, and
essentially consist only of errors in law made by a lower court, 95
such as when a court imposes a sentence other than one that is
authorized by law in relation to a felony offence. 96
92. McKillop, supra n. 66, at 349.
93. CPP, art. 567.
94. See Cour de Cassation, Documents Translated into English, The Organisation of
the Court of Cassation, http://www.courdecassation.fr/IMG/File/About%20the%20court
mars09.pdf. (The pages in these translated documents are not numbered; scroll down to
the section headed "The Organisation of the Court of Cassation.")
95. See McKillop, supra n. 66, at 344 (pointing out that the Court of Cassation's
"jurisdiction is confined to 'violations of the law' in the lower courts and if a 'violation' is
found to exist the sanction is annulment of the decision").
96. CPP, art. 596.
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An application to the Court of Cassation proceeds on the
basis of the record,97 and "les rapports," rather than as a trial de
novo: "[L]es rapports sont faits A l'audience. Les avocats des
parties sont entendus dans leurs observations apr~s le raport,
s'il y a lieu. Le ministbre public pr6sente ses r6quisitions." The
report that is referred to here is apparently presented to the panel
hearing the application for cassation by a reporting judge of the
criminal chamber, essentially as a summary of the case.99 Once
this report has been provided, and after the lawyers have made
representations to the Court, a decision can be reached without
any need for further or fresh evidence.
When the Court of Cassation ultimately decides to annul a
judgment of a lower court, it does not substitute its decision for
the decision originally given by the lower court, but, rather,
remits the matter to a different court of the same level as the
original court for a new trial. 100 However, given that there is no
limitation placed upon the Court of Cassation in its authority to
determine the law applicable in criminal matters, and given that
it is the country's ultimate legal authority, responsible for the
"application correcte de la loi" that "ne rejuge pas les faits,"101
one can conclude that the standard of review applicable on
appeals to the Court of Cassation is correctness on questions of
law, with no review being performed on questions of fact.
5. Summarizing the Criminal Appeal Process in France
Some patterns are easily identifiable in French criminal
appeal processes. First, where appeals are permitted on
questions of fact (to the appeal court for petty offence and
misdemeanour appeals, or to an assize court hearing an appeal
97. See McKillop, supra n. 66, at 345 ("The Cour de cassation is confined in
considering questions of law to the brief written summary of the proceedings in the cour
d'assises made by the recording clerk (greffier) and to the record of the investigation, the
latter of which comprises the essentials of the dossier.").
98. CPP, art. 602 (indicating in the quoted passage that a report is presented to the
court, which then hears the comments of the parties' lawyers and the argument of the
prosecutor).
99. CPP, art. 603.
100. CPP, arts. 609-10.
101. Ministry of Justice Video, supra n. 81, at slide 34 (indicating that the Court of
Cassation's mission includes applying the law correctly and that it does not engage in
factfinding).
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on a felony matter), the standard of review applicable to such
questions is correctness-an appellate court in France that is
permitted to review factual matters will never owe deference to
a trial court. Second, an initial appeal in France is always taken
to a court composed of the same number of professional judges
as were found in the trial court (one judge for petty offence trials
and appeals, three judges for misdemeanour trials and appeals,
and three professional judges at the assize court for trials and
appeals of felony offences). Third, an initial appeal in France is
always a trial de novo, whether as a new jury trial (at the assize
court hearing an appeal), or as an appeal to the appeal court
where the case can essentially be re-opened and re-tried in
accordance with the applicable rules of evidence.
These features of the French appeal process differ
significantly from the Canadian process, if for no other reason
than because the enabling laws in each jurisdiction are different.
The examination of the ways in which judges are educated,
appointed, trained, and promoted in each country that follows,
however, makes it possible to argue that criminal appeals in
France and Canada are different (at least in part) because these
two jurisdictions conceive of criminal judiciaries in
fundamentally distinct ways.
IV. CRIMINAL JUDICIARIES IN CANADA AND FRANCE
A. Canadian Criminal Judges
Federally appointed criminal judges in Canada-that is to
say, judges of superior courts and Courts of Appeal within the
provinces, and judges of the SCC-are eligible for appointment
to the bench once they have accumulated ten years standing at
the bar of any province. 102 Judges of provincial (inferior)
criminal courts must typically have five years standing at the bar
102. Judges Act, R.S.C. 1985, ch. J-1, § 3; Supreme Court Act, supra n. 41, at § 5. This
implies that they must also have an undergraduate law degree, because that is a prerequisite
for bar admission in all Canadian jurisdictions. See e.g. Federation of Law Societies of
Canada, National Committee on Acceditation, NCA Resources, FAQ 26, http://www.flsc.ca
/en/nca/nca-resources/faqs (2012) (noting that in Canada "only three year LL.B./J.D.
graduates qualify for admission to the Bar") (accessed Mar. 23, 2012; copy on file with
Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
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of a province in order to be eligible for appointment.1 0 3 In
practice, however, new judges have significantly more than the
minimum number of years standing as lawyers when they are
selected for judicial positions; the three most recent appointees
to the Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta, for instance, had an
average of over twenty-seven years since they were first called
to a provincial or territorial bar prior to joining the judiciary.' 0 4
Similarly, the advisory committee in Nova Scotia that makes
recommendations to the Lieutenant-Governor of the province
for the appointment of Provincial Court judges "will not
recommend a Candidate with less than fifteen years standing at a
Bar in a Canadian jurisdiction for appointment except where the
Committee feels that there are exceptional circumstances to
warrant that recommendation." 05
The appointment of judges in Canada is a political process.
Provincially appointed candidates must typically be
recommended by a Minister (often the Attorney General), and
must be appointed by the Lieutenant Governor of the Province
(or the Governor in Council). 106 Federal appointments, in
contrast,
are made by the Governor General acting on the advice of
the federal Cabinet. A recommendation for appointment is
made to Cabinet by the Minister of Justice with respect to
the appointment of puisne judges, and by the Prime
Minister with respect to the apointment of Chief Justices
and Associate Chief Justices.
However, there is typically an independent assessment
mechanism to assist political figures in appointing the most
highly qualified judges. For instance, at the federal level, the
Office of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs
103. See e.g. Provincial Court Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, ch. 238, § 5 [hereinafter "Provincial
Court Act"].
104. Department of Justice Canada, Alberta Judicial Appointments Announced, http://
www.justice.gc.ca/eng/news-nouv/ja-nj/201 1/doc_32593.html.
105. Courts of Nova Scotia, Executive Council, Provincial Judicial Appointments:
Guidelines to Ensure Appointments Based on Merit at 2, http://www.courts.ns.cal
conduct/prov judgesappointguide 09 03_17.pdf.
106. See e.g. Provincial Court Act, at §§ 3(l)-(2A).
107. Office of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs Canada, Process for an
Application for Appointment 8, http://www.fja.gc.ca/appointments-nominations/process-
regime-eng.html (Oct. 16, 2009) [hereinafter "FJA Appointments Process"].
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has an appointments secretariat which administers 17
advisory committees responsible for evaluating candidates
for federal judicial appointments. The Minister of Justice
has given FJA the mandate to administer the Supreme
Court of Canada Appointments Selection Panel process,
established to evaluate candidates for appointment to the
Supreme Court of Canada. 08
Some of the factors that federal judicial advisory
committees will explore and consider when assessing a
candidate's suitability include "reputation among professional
peers and in the general community," "awareness of racial and
gender issues," "humility," and "courtesy."' 09 As all of the
above information tends to suggest, the appointment of criminal
court judges in Canada is accomplished through a process that
engages significant government resources and the individual
attention of senior political figures, whether within a province or
at the federal level.
Criminal judges in Canada are appointed to permanent
positions, and hold office during "good behavior."'10 This means
that judicial appointments are only ever terminated when a judge
reaches compulsory retirement age (typically age 75,11 although
sometimes age 70 for provincially appointed judges, depending
on the provincel 2), or when a judge is removed from office for
cause by a Lieutenant-Governor of a province or by the
Governor General of Canada.' 13 Because judicial appointments
are permanent, there are no individually negotiated promotions
or salary increments for any particular judicial position,'l 4 and,
108. Office of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs Canada, Our Role, http://
www.fja.gc.calfja-cmf/role-eng.html (July 22, 2008).
109. Office of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs Canada, Assessment
Criteria, Candidates for Federal Judicial Appointment, http://www.fja.gc.calappointments-
nominations/assessment-evaluation-eng.html (Nov. 14, 2007).
110. See e.g. Supreme Court Act § 9(1); Provincial Court Act § 6(1).
111. See e.g. Supreme Court Act § 9(2).
112. See e.g. Provincial Court Act § 6(2).
113. See e.g. Supreme Court Act § 9(1).
114. See e.g. Office of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs Canada, Federal
Judicial Appointments-Considerations Which Apply to an Application for Appointment,
Remuneration, Salaries as of April 12, 2011, http://www.fja.gc.ca/appointments-
nominations/considerations-eng.html (May 18, 2011) (indicating that the base salary
(excluding any cost of living allowances) for all federally appointed puisne judges of
Appeal, Superior, Supreme, and Queen's Bench courts within each province, regardless of
a judge's years of experience, was then $281,100.00) [hereinafter "FJA Salaries"].
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therefore, no routine performance assessments or appraisals for
judges. In other words, in order for a judge to move upward
from a position in a lower court to a higher court, or upward
from a puisne position to a Chief Justice or Associate Chief
Justice position within his or her current court, a judge must be
freshly appointed into the new position just as if appointed into
the position from outside of the judiciary.15
It is also worth noting that there is no salary difference
between a puisne judge of a superior trial court and a Court of
Appeal in any province, just as there is no difference between
the salaries of the Chief Justices of these two levels of courts.1 6
Within the federal scheme of judicial compensation, then, a
judge of a provincial Court of Appeal is an equal, at least in
terms of salary, to a judge of a provincial Supreme Court.
In summary, one could describe the Canadian criminal
judiciary as group of individuals who each have significant
experience in the practice of law prior to their appointments as
judges, and who are employed within a very static judicial
regime that is not characterized by merit-based reappointment
processes, salary increases, or promotions. Furthermore, very
little distinction is made between the initial appointment
processes, minimum qualifications, and compensation schemes
of trial and first-level appeal court judges within the federally
appointed criminal judiciary.
B. French Criminal Judges
Judicial careers in France, as in most civil law countries,
are in many ways comparable to careers within other
government departments: "Civil law judiciaries of continental
115. Some of the appointment application processes may be modified with respect to
candidates who are already members of a judiciary instead of practicing lawyers or law
professors. For instance,
[p]rovincial or territorial court judges who wish to be candidates must also
notify the Commissioner of their interest in a federal judicial appointment by
completing a Personal History Form for judges. These candidates are not
assessed by the advisory committees, but their files are submitted to the
appropriate committee for comments which are then provided to the Minister of
Justice, including the results of any confidential consultations undertaken by the
committee.
FJA Appointments Process, supra n. 107.
116. FJA Salaries, supra n. 114.
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Europe do not differ fundamentally from the state bureaucracy,
and reflect the old division of law from politics."l17 In France,
this reality is seen in the fact that "the management of the
ordinary judiciary and the courts is primarily the function of the
Ministry of Justice,"" 8 a department of the government of
France.
The similarity between judicial and other public sector
careers within continental Europe begins at the point of entry
into government employment:
Traditionally, recruitment into the judiciary has been based
on criteria and procedures very similar to those governing
entrance into the civil service. In most civil law countries,
the largest proportion of judges are still recruited directly
from university through some form of public examination
(normally run by the Ministry of Justice), and with no
requirement of previous professional experience." 9
This selection process is still used in France, where training
of the judiciary "is also centralized and takes place at the
national school, the Ecole Nationale de la Magistrature (ENM
entrance to which is by extremely competitive examination."
Although there are "some thirteen different entry routes"'21 into
the French judiciary, the primary entry route is through a
concours, or written examination competition.'22 One prominent
concours has been described as largely "designed for those
leaving university,"' 23 and the "typical portrait of an entrant" to
this concours has been described as a woman "twenty-five years
old, with a Master's degree in law, coming from the Paris area
and prepared for entry at the Institut des 6tudes judiciaires of the
University of Paris 2."l124 Thus, a typical entrant to the judiciary
in France will not have any previous experience in the practice
of law.
117. Carlo Guarnieri, Appointment and Career of Judges in Continental Europe: The
Rise ofJudicial Self-Government, 24 Leg. Stud. 169, 170 (2004).
118. Bell, supra n. 58, at 50.
119. Guarnieri, supra n. 117, at 170.
120. Jacqueline Hodgson, Hierarchy, Bureaucracy and Ideology in French Criminal
Justice: Some Empirical Observations, 29 J. L. & Society 227, 235 (2002).
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After being selected for entrance into the judiciary,
candidates in France undergo a two-year training period at the
ENM, consisting of courses and some practical placements with
various organizations involved in the administration of
justice. Again, however, judicial selection and training
processes in European civilian legal systems tend to have a
theoretical, rather than an experiential, focus:
Legal education is typically multi-purpose, providing a
general knowledge of all relevant branches of the law at the
expense of any form of specialisation. As a consequence,
selection incorporates little or no emphasis on the practical
side of the work of the judiciary, and is made on the basis
of written and oral exams that test the candidates'
theoretical knowledge of the law.126
The relative youth and inexperience of newly selected French
judges that follows from this selection and training process
contrasts sharply with the Canadian standard of, realistically,
appointing to the bench only applicants who have already
practiced law for some twenty years.
With respect to promotions and career advancement,
members of the criminal judiciary in France are subject to the
control of both the political branch of the Government of
France, and other judges. For instance, the highest grades of
judges (including all judges of the cassation court, and first
presidents of appeal courts) are appointed by the president of the
Republic, but they are selected from among only those
candidates proposed by the Conseil Superieur de la
Magistrature (CSM);1 27 all lower grades of criminal judges are
proposed by the Minister of Justice, but these candidates are
subsequently scrutinized by the CSM for suitability, and the
125. Id. at 54.
126. Guarnieri, supra n. 117, at 170.
127. The CSM includes mostly elected members of the judiciary, and is responsible for
aspects of appointment and discipline within the judiciary. See e.g. Conseil Superieur de la
Magistrature, Missions et Attributions, http://www.conseil-superieur-magistrature.fr/
missions-et-attributions (indicating that the Conseil Superieur de la Magistrature shall have
the power to propose candidates for seats on the highest courts); Conseil Superieur de la
Magistrature, Historique, http://www.conseil-superieur-magistrature.fr/historique (tracing
the CSM's history from 1883 through 2008) (both accessed Mar. 23, 2012; copies on file
with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process); see also Bell, supra n. 58, at 51 (pointing
out that "in its present structure, the CSM is strongly representative of the judges and offers
a limited judicial self-government, confined to appointments").
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recommendations of the CSM to the Minister are binding on the
Minister.128 As the appointment process suggests, there is a mix
of judicial and political involvement, of varying proportions, in
the selection of French judges for different positions.
When it comes to promotions (and incremental salary
increases) within a judicial grade, however, control rests
predominantly with more senior judges.129 As "continental
European judiciaries operate within a pyramid-like
organisational structure," an individual judge's
[s]alary, prestige, and personal influence depend on [his or
her] position on the hierarchical ladder and can be
improved only through promotions. These are granted on a
competitive basis and according to two criteria, seniority
and merit, the latter being determined through assessments
by senior judges. 3 0
This civil-service-based model of judicial evaluation and
career progression is adhered to in France as in many other
European countries. In France, there are two "grades" of
judges-deuxibme grade (the entry level), and premiere grade
(to which one can be promoted on the basis of merit). Within
each of these ranks, there are also multiple seniority levels.131 In
addition, senior French judges have management roles within
their courts that require them to act "as hierarchical superiors
(e.g. in monitoring performance and promotions and as persons
responsible for ensuring cases are properly distributed among
judges),"32 essentially controlling the progression of junior
judges through the seniority and rank tiers. Thus, unlike in
Canada, where judges are never formally assessed after they
have been appointed to the bench, judges in France are
bureaucratically assessed in the performance of their duties on
an ongoing basis.
128. See e.g. Conseil Superieur de la Magistrature, Missions et Attributions, supra n.
127.
129. See e.g. Guarnieri, supra n. 117, at 174 (noting that "[h]ierarchical superiors play a
fundamentally important role in determining judicial status in most continental countries").
130. Id.
13 1. Ordonnance n' 58-1270 du 22 decembre 1958 portant loi organique relative au
statut de la magistrature, Art. 2 (Feb. 15, 2012). (The statute's official text is available at
Rdpublique Frangaise, Legifrance, http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=
JORFTEXT000000339259.)
132. Bell, supra n. 58, at 51.
192
APPEALS AND APPELLATE JUDGES IN CANADA AND FRANCE
In summary, then, one could describe members of the
French criminal judiciary in the following terms: Judges start
out as young law school graduates who have no previous
experience in the practice of law; they attend common basic
training at a single, national school for judges (the ENM); and,
they are assessed in the performance of their duties by other
judges, while being selected for successive appointments within
the magistratural hierarchy on the basis of input from both
political and other judicial figures. The contrast between
Canadian and French judicial institutions on these points, as can
now be seen, is unmistakable.
V. RELATING CHARACTERISTICS OF THE JUDICIARY TO
APPEAL PROCESSES IN CANADA AND FRANCE
As I suggested at the outset of this paper, I think that a link
exists between the way in which judges are appointed, trained,
promoted, and generally perceived within a legal system, and
the way in which that system's criminal appeal process operates.
However, any effort to understand this link must begin with
some consideration of the assumptions that are (either explicitly
or implicitly) held by stakeholders within legal systems about
the capabilities of judges to perform their various duties.
A. Assumptions Arising from the Treatment of Questions of Law
I will begin my analysis in this section by studying the
treatment that questions of law receive in criminal matters in
Canada and France. For instance, what statement might be made
about the abilities that judges have to determine law, both at trial
and on appeal, within Canada's criminal justice system? First,
we know that the standard of review on questions of law at
every criminal appellate court is correctness, which signifies that
appellate courts are free to intervene in decisions of-or owe no
deference to-trial courts on questions of law. We also know
that, with the exception of first-level appeals to SCACs relating
to the most minor type of criminal offences, initial and
subsequent appeals are determined by increasingly larger panels
of judges (i.e., one trial judge's decision is appealed to three or
five Court of Appeal judges, and their decision is appealed to
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seven or nine SCC judges). These considerations, taken
together, tend to suggest that Canada's legal system assumes
that appellate courts are better able to determine law than trial
courts.
At first glance, this seems to be a strange proposition, given
that appeal court judges are often appointed from within the
same FJA process as trial judges, with the same sorts of
education and practical legal backgrounds as trial judges,
without (necessarily) any greater judicial experience than trial
judges, and often with the same salary as trial judges. Clearly,
then, Canada's criminal appeal laws do not suggest that an
individual appellate judge is inherently more capable of
determining the law than an individual criminal trial judge.
There are, therefore, two likely bases upon which Canada's
apparent assumption of increased judicial competence to state
the law on appeal might rest:
* first, that successive Canadian appellate panels, by
virtue of their increasing size, are actually more
capable of getting the right answer to a question of
law (a strength-in-numbers assumption), or
* second, that appellate panels, by virtue of their law-
standardizing function,133 and regardless of whether
they are capable of objectively determining the right
answer to legal questions, must have the ability to
intervene in and correct interpretations of law in
lower courts, if only for the sake of uniformity in
the application of criminal laws.
It seems that one of these rationales must underlie the reality
reflected in Canada's criminal appellate laws, or else there
would be no sense in allowing liberal appellate intervention in
trial court decisions on questions of law: Either more judges
make better law, or better law is just a secondary goal that is of
lesser importance than standardized law within our legal system.
These are interesting assumptions about judges that may help to
explain why Canadian law allows for appeals in a given way.
133. See text accompanying nn. 9 & 10, supra.
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In France, questions of law are treated by appellate courts
in essentially the same manner as by Canadian appellate courts:
The standard of review by all French criminal appellate courts
on questions of law is correctness. Again, this standard tends to
suggest that, within French legal culture, appellate courts are
assumed to be better judges of the law than trial courts. The
basis for this assumption, however, is likely very different in
France than in Canada.
Appeals in France are determined by courts that are
essentially the same in judicial composition as the trial courts
from which the appeals arise. (Trial and appeal courts are each
presided over by one judge for petty offences, three judges for
misdemeanours, and three professional judges with jury
augmentation for felonies.) Consequently, a strength-in-numbers
argument would not carry much weight in the French context:
French appellate courts are simply deemed superior judges of
law, even though they are not superior in judicial numbers.
Although one could attempt to argue, as in Canada, that a law-
standardizing function at French appellate courts explains the
interventionist standard of review applicable on questions of
law, and although this would be a reasonably compelling
argument, the logic is less persuasive in France's civil law
system (where deductive reasoning prevails) than in a common
law system (where adherence to precedent prevails).
Standardization, while important, is not as much a paramount
jurisprudential consideration in France as it is in Canada.
Thus, the most convincing explanation for the French
standard of review is simply that the French legal system
assumes that French appellate courts are inherently better judges
of law than French trial courts: In a system where judges
progress through seniority levels and ranks in order to move up
the "ladder" or hierarchy of judicial roles, and in a system where
judges are routinely assessed in the performance of their duties
(which would only be necessary if there was a spectrum of
competence within the judicial world), there must also exist an
assumption, unlike any assumption in Canada, that judges are
capable of learning more law, or of better understanding the
complexities of law, as they progress through their careers
toward positions on an appeal court bench.
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The only place where the above explanation is insufficient
is at the assize court, where trials and appeals involve only three
(presumably equally qualified) professional judges. Recall,
however, that a jury consists of twelve members on appeal, and
only nine members at a first-instance trial, so in this context
perhaps there is an element of the "strength in numbers"
rationale operating even within the French criminal appeal
system. Ultimately, however, it would seem that the design of a
Canadian appellate system is heavily predicated on assumptions
about "strength in numbers" and perhaps on a recognition that
standardized law is sometimes more important than objectively
"correct" law (if there can be such a thing), while the French
system is likely designed more on the basis of an assumption
about judicial potential to improve in judging law over time.
B. Assumptions Arising from the Treatment ofFindings ofFact
Keeping in mind, however, that French and Canadian
appeal processes are different not so much in the ways in which
they treat questions of law, but in the ways in which they treat
questions of fact, I will now attempt to uncover what
assumptions reside within each legal system about the abilities
of judges to find facts at trial and on appeal.
In Canada, we know that the standard of appellate review
on questions of fact is reasonableness, or some variant of the
concept-appeal courts are not to intervene in the findings of
fact or the inferences of fact made by a trial court unless there is
a palpable and overriding error that makes these factual
conclusions unreasonable. This standard of review applies even
though appeal courts are almost invariably composed of more
judges than trial courts, and even though appeal courts have a
law-standardizing role that trial courts do not share. We also
know that Canadian appellate courts are not, by default,
presented with the opportunity to review evidence in order to
make factual determinations, since appellate courts generally
proceed on the basis of the record when determining appeals.
When this information is considered as a whole, it tends to
suggest that the following assumptions underlie Canadian
criminal appellate laws: first, that no one (appeal) judge is better
than any other (trial) judge at finding facts; second, that no
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group of (appeal) judges is better than any single (trial) judge at
finding facts; and, third, that no group of (appeal) judges is
better than a jury at finding facts.
What logic grounds the above assumptions about judicial
competencies in Canada? As in France, the assumptions that we
hold about judicial abilities are likely attributable to the
appointment, training, education, and employment processes for
judges. For instance, Canadian judges are largely deemed to be
equals amongst themselves, in terms of selection criteria (the
same ten years at a provincial bar qualifies one for federal
appointment to a criminal trial court and to the SCC), pay
(Supreme Court and Court of Appeal judges within a province
are paid equally), lack of promotion opportunity, and lack of
assessments. As a result of these factors, there is simply no
officially sanctioned way to distinguish between a "better" and a
"worse" judge in the Canadian judicial system, so all judges
must, inherently, be equally capable of finding facts in criminal
matters.
It is somewhat surprising, however, that a group of
(appellate) judges can be deemed better at stating the law than a
single (trial) judge, but the same group of judges is not deemed
to be more capable of finding facts than a single judge. This
situation is partially explained by the fact that Canadian
appellate courts have a strong law-standardizing role, but no
comparable fact-standardizing role; indeed, one of the supposed
strengths of the common law system is its flexibility to deal with
individual cases on the basis of unique facts, so it would be
wholly undesirable for appellate courts to intervene in a trial
judge's factual findings in order to prescribe a uniform template
for the treatment of certain types of facts in future cases. The
situation is probably also explained, however, by the Canada's
common law history of reliance upon and deference toward
juries-the ultimate arbiters of reasonableness on questions of
fact-in criminal trials. In other words, Canadian appellate
courts might today be deferential to trial judges on questions of
fact simply out of a historical habit of deference toward the
original criminal fact-finders: the jury members. Perhaps,
however, the state of criminal appellate law can best be
explained by Canadian conceptions of the very nature of facts in
a criminal trial: Facts, in the Canadian consciousness, are
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subjective and malleable. The chance of improving on a factual
finding is not necessarily increased, therefore, by having
evidence considered by more judges, or higher-level judges.
In France, questions of fact are treated in essentially the
same manner as questions of law on appeal: No deference is
owed to a trial court, and an appeal proceeds as a trial de novo,
even though initial appellate courts are made up of the same
number of judges as the associated trial courts. Again, this
reality tends to suggest that the French assume their appellate
courts are more capable of finding facts than their trial courts. 134
As with questions of law, the most persuasive explanation
for the French standard of review on questions of fact is that
appellate courts in France are seen as being inherently better
judges of fact than trial courts. This conception of judicial
competence is likely tied to a belief, unlike any belief held in
Canada, that facts can be objectively determined, and that there
are distinctly better and worse findings of fact rather than just
reasonable and unreasonable ones. Furthermore, the assumption
that French appellate courts are more qualified to find facts than
trial courts again probably flows from the core qualities of the
French criminal judiciary: It is hierarchical and bureaucratic,
and it consists of first-level judges who are, in relative terms,
extremely inexperienced in law. Such an institution of judges
must therefore be constructed around a belief that, with
experience and seniority, each member will improve as both a
trier of fact and as a judge of law, which, in turn, supports the
idea of liberal appellate intervention (by more experienced
judges) at successively higher courts.
134. It is interesting to note, however, that appellate procedures at the Court of Cassation
conform to a different, more deferential paradigm for assessing facts-a paradigm that
closely resembles Anglo-American thinking about criminal appellate law. It is difficult to
reconcile the Court of Cassation's role as strictly a juge de droit (that will not routinely re-
examine factual findings made by in lower courts) with the otherwise coherent body of
French appellate law that provides appeal courts with wide latitude to intervene in and alter
the factual findings of trial courts. Perhaps, as the unique role of the Court of Cassation
suggests, even the strongly civil and Napoleonic French legal system is beginning to adopt
certain elements of Anglo-American common law procedure.
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VI. CONCLUSION
This paper began with a simple question: Why are criminal
appeals in Canada and France so different? The prima facie
answer-that the appeal systems are different because their
enabling laws are different-is incomplete and intellectually
unsatisfying. The real challenge, therefore, lies in finding out
why French and Canadian criminal appeal laws diverge.
As the preceding discussion has demonstrated, one of the
major reasons why criminal appeals are handled so differently in
the Canadian and French systems is because these two
jurisdictions educate, train, appoint, and employ their judges in
vastly different ways. On the one hand, Canadian judges at all
levels share a common minimum of education and experience
before they are appointed to the bench, and they comprise a
relatively static profession once they are sitting judges, in that
they are never given raises, promotions, or assessments.
Regardless of the courts over which they preside, Canadian
criminal judges as individuals are, theoretically, equally capable
of determining both law and fact, and it is only the roles of the
different courts, or the numbers of judges that decide a given
case within each court, that permit higher-level courts some
degree of superiority as judges of law.
French judges, on the other hand, typically begin their
careers with no prior legal experience. As a result, there is a
marked distinction between junior and senior judges, with the
latter having significantly greater expertise in both finding fact
and stating law. Furthermore, even when two French judges
have an equal and significant amount of experience on the
bench, the French system assumes that official distinctions (in
the form of assessments) can be made between these judges in
terms of their individual competencies to perform as judges.
Consequently, French criminal appeals are designed to allow the
more competent appellate judges to intervene liberally on any
questions of law or fact addressed by the trial courts.
It is important to understand how, in France and Canada,
and arguably in any jurisdiction, links such as those described
above will tend to exist between criminal appeal processes and
the core characteristics of the criminal judiciary in the given
jurisdiction. Only once these links are identified and understood
199
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
can scholars go on to ask more complicated policy questions,
such as whether a particular appeal system makes sense, because
the "good sense" of an appeal system cannot fairly be evaluated
without considering relative judicial qualifications, as between
trial and appeal courts, to determine questions of law and fact.
Alternately, we might want to know whether it would be
desirable to adopt element X of the appellate process from
foreign jurisdiction Y, but it would first be important to know
how jurisdiction Y's judiciary is different from our own before
we adopt an element of appellate procedure that might not
correspond properly with our own judiciary's capabilities. Thus,
in any comparative, or even wholly internal, analysis of
appellate law reform, or law reform dealing with the judiciary,
the interaction between judges and appeals must be
recognized-even if this means (as it has throughout the
preceding discussion) searching beyond the obvious answer to
the simple question in order to satisfactorily address the heart of
the inquiry.
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